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Fülep, Lajos (1885-1970) – Hungarian philosopher, art his-
torian. One of the dominant, though partly forgotten, figures in
20th century Hungarian art philosophy and art history. Some
experts regard his oeuvre as a being dated, and for this rea-
son consider it unnecessary to study his work however there
are a number who consider him “the creator of modern Hun-
garian art history”, and the real founder of the methodological
approach called “Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte” (art
history as the history of ideas/spirit), even preceding the works
of Max Dvorˇák in this field. This paper looks at his writings on
architecture and on art philosophy related to architecture. The
titles in order of appearance: The role of the memory in the
artistic creation (1911), Hungarian Architecture (1918), Expe-
dience and art in the architecture (1944), A great opportunity in
the rebuilding of Budapest and the country (1948).
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Lajos Fülep (1885-1970) art historian and art philosopher, is
a dominant figure in Hungarian art philosophy of the 20th cen-
tury, who compared to the significance of his oeuvre, has been
somewhat forgotten.
There are some who consider his ideas and theories out of
date and discredited, and for this reason they do not find it im-
portant to acquire a deeper knowledge of his thoughts. But oth-
ers, of whom there are fewer, are of the opinion that he was
actually “the creator of modern Hungarian art history” and at
the same time the real founder of “Kunstgeschichte als Geistes-
geschichte”, preceding the work of Max Dvorˇák that was devel-
oping in the period around 1910 [15].
It might be a belated question today whether the matter,
namely the priority of the approach of “art history as the his-
tory of spirit” is true or false, which could not be or should not
be answered; notwithstanding, it is (or it might be) also a rel-
evant question to be discussed and proved. Just as it is also of
great importance to ensure it be known that even in international
terms, Fülep was one of the first ones who understood the rev-
olutionary relevance of Cézanne’s painting, or that he was an
internationally recognized expert on Dante [3–5,8].
Besides this, he was a great authority on the philosophy of
Nietzsche and Bergson, and early on he became an appreciative
critic of the aesthetics of Benedetto Croce. The title of his essay
on this subject: The role of the memory in the artistic creation,
was written and first published in Italian.1
Though the topic of his essay on the philosophy of art goes
beyond architecture, his theory on the quality of forming, i.e.
producing a form, creating something, and the function of the
productive memory is tightly connected to the issue of architec-
tural expression and formation. His posing of memory has risen
in a polemic context; his statements reflect the thesis mentioned
in the influential work “Aesthetic” written by Benedetto Croce
[1].
According to Croce knowledge has two forms: “it is either
intuitive knowledge or logical knowledge; knowledge obtained
through the imagination or knowledge obtained through the in-
tellect; knowledge of the individual or knowledge of the univer-
1[6], the discussion in relation with the lecture: [7].
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sal; of individual things or of the relations between them: it is, in
fact, productive either of images or of concepts. (. . . ) intuitive
knowledge is expressive knowledge. (. . . ) intuition or represen-
tation is distinguished as form from what is felt or suffered, from
the flux or wave of sensation, or from physical material; and this
form, this taking possession of, is expression. To have an intu-
ition is to express. It is nothing else (nothing more but nothing
less) than to express.”[2, pp.241-242],[16]
However, according to Fülep, the aesthetics of Croce did not
re-integrate the understanding of the artist’s creativity into the
completeness of the normal psyche, and later he did not prop-
erly differentiate it within the field of creativity. He also criti-
cizes Croce’s understanding of the role of intuition which states
that: on the one hand art is intuition and nothing else, on the
other hand intuition is identical with the expression, and con-
sequently all kinds of expression are artistic activities. While
Fülep states: “Intuition creates nothing from nothing. The thing
which places the objects is memory (or reality in case of percep-
tion), so objects are the products of memory and not intuition.”
[7, p. 611]
Regarding the relationship between memory and expression,
he explains that along with the expression of things in the past,
expression of things in the present also works as a kind of rec-
ollection, and all intuition appearing in the present has to be
changed into recollection in order to be expressible, and to turn
into art. “In other words, in the complex phenomenon called
recollection the attendant emotion has to have the same fate as
the image generating it: emotion first has to become intuition,
intuition must turn into recollection for making recollection be-
come expression in the end.”2
On the basis of the above, Fülep defines his proposition
against the statement of Croce, namely that intuition is expres-
sion: “every expression is recollection”. But there is no art
without intuition, since the artist can only remember the char-
acteristics that he was able to see. At the same time, the artist
submits his feelings and intuition to the selection – which can
be both an automatic and an intended action – which is executed
by recollection.
The emotion, the state of mind, which can be considered as a
source of intuition, is one and undividable, continuous, unlim-
ited, with no start and no end; it can be described with indivis-
ibility, unity, qualitative multiplicity. Though the expression in
the end of the artistic forming process is non-continuous, it has
a start and an end, it consists of elements and quantities next
to each other, and not only the exterior-originated (extrinsecus)
expression coming from outside possesses these features.
2 [7, p. 612]; – the second part of the quotation: “Intuition is always related
to present, but present can never be expressed: we always express a vanished
state of mind, and at the time as we express it, present connects a new state of
mind to it, which becomes at that moment past again to be expressible, and so
on till the end of time - and the expression can never get free from the past and
recollection and can never be directly united with the intuition of the present
state of mind. ”
There is a complete contrast between the continuous state of
mind and the non-continuous quantities, and the quantitative
concept of space and time; nevertheless, only these quantita-
tive, non-continuous notions make it possible to express. These
quantitative, non-continuous notions and elements actually di-
vide the undividable part of memory, the inner spiritual life; thus
they make it possible to place next to each other and to observe
things far from one another in time or to examine those coherent
things separately. “Our recollection divides past, the motionless
time to parts and phases; turns the quality of the states of mind
and intensities into quantities, in order to operate with them.”
[7, p. 625]
For example, the motionless (past) time can only be seized
through the idea of space, and for this the clearly spatial ideas
of “back” and “forth” are essential. But in relation to this, there
is much more here than our idea of space intruding our concept
of time, as it is claimed by Bergson, since it is quite true that the
concept of time cannot be imagined without the notion of space
at all. All moments before and after, meaning remembrance and
prevision, are at smaller or greater distances from the present.
Fülep states “The present is: continuity, but for this continuity
to become conscious in me I need the inner vision of space, for
the things in front of and behind me; present is continuity but it
only becomes conscious with the contrast of incontinuity. Where
only continuity exists it can never be conscious. Where there is
only succession (durée) it cannot be conscious. The moments of
present are undividedly interlaced in continuity like the points
of motion; they only become conscious by recollection, which is
based on space and operates with incontinuity.” [7, p. 626]
The ideas of physical space and time are also important in the
creation of the artistic form, just as the extension and duration –
meaning the content (durée) – are also essential. Extension and
duration (durée) are the contents of the direct approach, while
absolute space and time are part of the memory. In order to
create the expression (and the artistic form), the first, extension
and succession/durée, have to go through the second, through
absolute space and time. Only in this way, namely with the help
of quantitative qualities, can the extension and succession, unity
and continuity be created again within the artistic form, with
a different character from the real(ity). That is to say that the
pure quality being an undivided state of mind is divided and
becomes quantity, after that, within the form the quantity turns
into quality again and becomes a whole again.
Consequently, the ideas of space and time play an important
role in expression. But at the same time, it is also necessary to
emphasize that the expression is never equal to the direct intu-
ition of the mind – the emotion which gives the starting point of
the process, but it is rather a summary, synthesis, symbol of that
emotion.
In relation with art and artistic expression, some relevant con-
sequences can be drawn from the above. One of them, in the
light of these thoughts is that artistic imagination is not the tal-
ent of reaching away from reality, but the form exceeding reality.
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Recollection, this productive ability of the intellect, can be dis-
tinguished from reality by a “certain form”, namely the artistic
form.
Also in the context of language, artistic form is a significant
criterion: “we acquire the notions from the elemental, unex-
pressed intuitions (images); and from notions we can get the
appropriate term, the words. And only after we have found the
expression for the general, the notion, can we arrive at the ex-
pression of individual intuition. That is why art is the complete
contrast of mere language, art starts where language ends. . . ”3
Above all, there is a much more important conclusion or con-
sequence, namely that the most relevant factors in art, which are
form and composition, can really be interpreted in this concrete
theoretical context - i.e. the origin of art is the memory. When
man transfers the sensations of “the runaway present” into form,
he not only preserves them but also sets himself free from them.
“The same thing that the average man does with simple state-
ment and the religious one with confession, the poet and artist
do when they form: they are remembering but at the same time
they set themselves free from the experiences of the past..”.4
However, the act of forming is similar to this process
even when the composing is not intended to be this lib-
erator/emancipator, confession-like action. When the form-
creating, composing recollection is deliberate, then the concrete,
clear and final contour of the form evolves only step by step from
the obscure, wreathing and liquid state. In art, just as in recol-
lection in general, the forming and composing effort is focused
on raising the final form out of the chaotic context of reality – of
nature.
Nature is typical of its kaleidoscope-like variety; there is nei-
3[7, p. 630]. Some conclusions can be drawn from this statement. One
of them is that without notions the formal expression is impossible, seemingly
the basic or pre-condition of the form would be the notion emerging from the
context of language. At the same time, this does not come from the context of
the whole train of thoughts, or even if this is the conclusion, it is much more
important that the artistic form is not really the consequence of the notion: “art
(. . . ) starts where language has ended.”
4[7, p. 633]; it is worth to quote a longer part of this train of thoughts
(pp. 633-634.): “When the fact of recollection is intended and not accidental or
automatic, so when with several attempts and concentration we are able to follow
the stages of its development and we can analyze it, then (and I believe with
this description I interpret the experiences of many of us) we can see a specific
fog, atmosphere or chaos with blurry, wobbling and uncertain boundaries thus
we can’t see the desired form completely at the very first instance (...) later
we perceive the whole figure in different situations (. . . ) finally in the straggle
against the atmosphere intruding and dissolving the contours of the figure we
construct the whole figure by pealing and clearing off the chaos – and in this
way we get the complete figure with its sharp contours, lines and forms. (. . . )
Similarly to the sculptor when he cuts away the surplus from the marble block
and leaves the essential, the figure that was hidden in the block.” On the one hand
these words are in harmony with the general experience of form-creators; and on
the other hand it is concordant with the message of for example Peter Zumthor
when he says in the film on the thermal bath of Vals the following about the
planning of the building: first the building was blurred but its complete image
has been (virtually) unchanged during the planning process and it has become
sharper, more exact and detailed by time.
ther a centre nor a favoured point of view in it: “there are only
details in nature, which are surrounded by infinity; on the other
hand, art gives not the details but totalities, closed unities, inde-
pendent completeness, from which the physical infinity and mere
nature are excluded.”
At the same time, recollection has a double character; Fülep
expresses it as “we are not only conserving impressions and ex-
periences, but incessantly forming and composing with them.
This is because it is easier to remember the formed and com-
posed things than the informed ones.” [7, p. 635]
As another consequence, we can only talk about artistic form
where the sensation and cognition of form-creating activity is
present. The concept and feeling of beauty makes it possible
to seize the aesthetic fact and content within the form-creating
activity. In the aesthetic experience, the cognition, the theoretic
momentum is only the preparatory stage.
The emotional momentum is of a great importance in the
artistic forming – “the feeling which enjoys the form, indepen-
dent from the content”. And this emotional momentum or feel-
ing, contrary to the intellectual and moral activities, is not a mere
attendant of the artistic activity states Lajos Fülep.
After this, he emphasizes in his typical manner: “in art – and
for aesthetics – an expression is not beautiful because it is well
done, but it is well done because it is beautiful. And the emo-
tion cannot be thrown back by scornfully calling it ’hedonism’
and considering it inferior to the main intellectual activities; be-
cause the feeling for beauty is one of the most superior activities
of the spirit and it is in relationship with religious emotions.”
Philosophy belongs to theory, art belongs to emotion. “They
have the same starting point but their ways are diverging and
their aims are controversial.” [7, p. 640]
Another specialty is that art is always idealizing and the basis
of this idealization in the meaning of the perfect form, can be
found in the world of memories.
The spiritual phenomenon which is closest to the artistic rec-
ollection is the dream, but this kind of memory misses all kinds
of practical tendencies. Contrarily, the memory of the artist is
active and autonomous, and transforms the sensational experi-
ence (sensation) into a pure approach in a way that changes the
perception by removing the present – or changing it to the past.
Among others, the difference between the two ways of recollec-
tion is that one of them has the main goal and dominant motif
focusing on memory itself, while the other’s main goal and dom-
inant motif are primarily sensation and perception.
In art, clear images of memory can be found independent
from practice and reality and in greater richness than usual. Art
aspires to escape from time and from eternity. “Those memo-
ries achieving their final form are like that moment of freedom,
which the mystic experiences in his ecstasy when being liberated
from existence he arrives to existence itself. However, these mo-
ments out of time and eternity are only temporary for the mystic
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as well – this is their biggest paradox.”5
Similarly to the mystic, the artist can also be part of time-
lessness and eternity by the finality of the completed forms, but
being human, he always has to return to time. Nevertheless,
during the creative process, present and past are at the same dis-
tance for the artist, and the name of this equal distance is form
concludes Lajos Fülep.
“Form – says Fülep – is not formality but the essence of
things.” The deepest and most permanent part of things: the
relation and unity of their element, and this is the “constructive
factor”. Reality is the sequence of moments; form is the ideal
co-existence of moments: “Only art creates complete and final
things, such phenomena that are the direct expressions of their
ideas. (. . . ) The piece of art cannot be reality (it is beyond re-
ality) not for but against it is illusion. (...) The unreality of art
stands above illusion.” [7, p. 648]
So the metaphysical importance of art comes out with the use
of form when it expresses the things beyond time, things that
never expire; not just in abstract ideas like philosophy or religion
but with the forms of phenomena created by art itself. That is
to say – now with reference to one of the relevant statements
of Fülep’s essays on architecture, or even quoting it – “art is
concrete” [10].
And with this statement we have finally arrived to the (con-
crete) theme of architecture and to the matter of the sensational–
concrete quality of architectural form. However, it is inter-
esting that Fülep formulates this approach of the concreteness
of (architectural) form in a compact, definition and, though it
is in accordance with his recollection theory, it appears in a
non-theoretical work. The title of his work written after the
2nd World War is: Egy nagy leheto˝ség Budapest és az ország
újjáépítésében [A great opportunity in the re-building of Bu-
dapest and the country]. The article suggests the Castle and
the castle district of Buda to be developed into a university and
cultural centre, and it starts with the definition of architecture.
According to that “architecture, as all kind of arts, is based on
the ground of concrete things: on the relation to people, na-
ture, world, on the fact that everything existing can be a simple
tool beyond being a mere object and can have a specific, unique
and relevant meaning that can only be seized, experienced and
expressed in the completeness of the concrete relation. (. . . )
Within this generality, architecture is special for not only focus-
ing separately on this or that aspect of reality, not only on this
or that field of reality, not only on human or nature, not only on
spiritual life or the richness of natural phenomena, not only on
events and processes, emotions or thoughts, not only on impres-
sions. But in it - (in architecture) – the concrete human attitude,
5[7, p. 644] – the phrasing can remind us of a similar sentence of Émanuel
Lévinas on art (which text is part of the train of thoughts with a partly opposing
end result): “this is a way of living where nothing is unconscious, but where a
consciousness, paralyzed in its freedom, is playing – and it becomes completely
loose in this play..” The expression of “wakeful dream” is also in harmony with
the approach of Fülep.
presumed by and being the basis of all the above, appears on
its own, it undertakes and make use of the part-potentials; how-
ever, always as a specific, most general attitude. Thus architec-
ture’s forms of presence are the categories – existing at other
places too – in their most general definition: space, mass, ma-
terial, form, strength, weight, statics, dynamics, scale, rhythm,
stillness, motion, light, shadow and so on. But in general and
concrete: it is a good metaphor for the fact that the human’s
relation can be concrete to a general category as well, we can
find such kinds of relation not only in geometry, in physics or in
the theoretical fields. [11 p.371]
So indirectly it is all about the creative memory’s quality
again which determines the form-creation – about that quality
which establishes the intuition of recollection and in this way
creates the sensual-concrete (architectural) form. Perhaps as
an analogy with the contemporary architectural approach, Pe-
ter Zumthor also emphasizes this sensual-concrete character of
form – just as he stresses elsewhere the role of memory in archi-
tectural forming.
“I find buildings again and again, that are created lavishly
seeking after special forms. The architect who created this thing
is not present but still he is talking away to me about all the de-
tails of the house, without any stop; and he says the same thing
over and over, thus it becomes indifferent to me in a minute.
Good architecture has to rise up people, let them live and
experience the house and not just talk men’s heads off.
Why, I often wonder, is the obvious but difficult solution so
rarely tried? Why do we have so little confidence in the basic
things architecture is made from: material, structure, bearing
and being borne, earth and sky, and confidence is spaces that
are really allowed to be spaces – spaces whose enclosing walls
and constituent materials, concavity, emptiness, light, air, odour,
receptivity and resonance are handled with respect and care?
I personally like the idea of designing and building houses
from which I can withdraw at the end of the forming process,
leaving behind a building that is itself, that serves as a place to
live in and a part of the world of things, and that can manage
perfectly well without my personal rhetoric.
To me, buildings can have a beautiful silence that I asso-
ciate with attributes such as composure, self-evidence, durabil-
ity, presence, and integrity, and with warmth and sensuousness
as well; a building that is being itself, being a building, not rep-
resenting anything, just being.
(. . . ) The reality of architecture is the concrete body in which
forms, volumes and spaces come into being. There are no ideas
except in things. This is the hard core of beauty.” 6
With his statement – “the reality of the building is its own
body”, Zumthor basically finds the spatial and formal concrete-
6 [17]; and he talks about the role of memory – of course in an indirect way –
in the film on the bath of Vals. Here he says the design process can be interpreted
as the development of the details of the building’s first appearing image, and the
result of this development is the work of art, the form of building correct in every
detail.
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ness of architectural creation determinative again, as a result of
spacing and forming. He also speaks about the sensational and
concrete, non-theoretic character of creation, similarly to Lajos
Fülep.
At the same time, the concreteness of the art work and art
in general - including architecture –has another meaning, i.e. –
quoting Gadamer – “the work of art addresses us on its own
and not as the transmitter of a message.” So the content and
meaning, which is revealed in the piece of art and speaks to us,
cannot be seized solely with notions.
The work of art carries not just an intellectual orientation
which can be conceptually understood, consequently – ad absur-
dum – it cannot be replaced. “The work of art, being irreplace-
able, works not just as the carrier of the meaning – because it
would mean it was possible to transfer the meaning to other car-
riers – writes Gadamer. On the contrary: the importance of the
work of art is based on its presence.”
The above becomes even more obvious when the work of art
is interpreted as formation; since, according to Gadamer, the
formation-like character of a work of art – here we should add:
especially in case of an architectural work – reveals the “skip”
which divides the design and construction process from the suc-
ceeding result.
This “skip” can separate the creator – just as everyone else
– from the creation or formation of his own work, which “is
present for the good of all, it is available for the one who ap-
proaches it, and it is visible in its ’capacity’. The skip represents
the work of art in its individuality and irreplaceablility.”
Due to its sensual, concrete, indispensable and irreplaceable
reality in the present and due to its formation-like quality, the
work of art encloses the intellect into such a solid shape - we
can say form - which on the one hand preserves, opens up, pro-
claims and makes unhidden the intellect-relations fixed in the
work of art, but on the other hand it hides and covers them.
“Besides the openness - and inseparably from it – there is the
covering and hiding, which are due in part to human limitations
– says Gadamer. This philosophical understanding - which re-
stricts the idealism from clear integration of meaning - has an-
other semantic content, namely that there is more in the artistic
creations than the message which can be experienced as an un-
defined meaning.” [13]
Continuing this train of thought, we could easily arrive at one
of the most important categories in the forming and form cre-
ation in fine art and architecture, namely, the visual, plastic, ar-
chitectonic – or rather to visual-plastic-architectonic – approach,
but in the course of the present essay we can only refer to it and
emphasize that the category came into existence partly on the
basis of Fülep’s recollection-theory.
In my opinion, the matters of recollection, sensual-concrete
form and visual-plastic-architectonic way of thinking, the
scientific-historical genesis of the concepts and categories and
their relation to the other would need a more detailed analysis,
phrasing and processing. And it would also be important to in-
tegrate these theories into the Hungarian architectural thinking
in order to avoid the dominance of irrelevant and secondary the-
ories from the architectural approach’s point of view, born in the
mesmerization of the momentary topicality.
Essentially the same thing happens with the most important
study on architecture by Lajos Fülep par excellence, called: Cél-
szeru˝ség és mu˝vészet az építészetben [Expedience and art in ar-
chitecture] –, namely that it is not an integrated part of the ar-
chitectural thinking or the reasoning on architecture [10].
The article was written in 1944, on the request of Jeno˝
Padányi Gulyás, architect and editor of the periodical “Archi-
tecture”, but since the journal was stopped because of the war,
only the first part of the essay had been published. However,
along with the text of the first part, the sketches of the whole or
at least the second part of the article have subsisted too. 7
The writing examines the influence of the relation between
expedience and art on the identity of modern architecture. “The
relation between expedience and art, their interference remains
a problem for today’s architecture” – states Fülep right at the be-
ginning of his study. Then he continues: “It has always been a
challenge, sometimes harder, sometimes easier but always pos-
sible to be fulfilled. (. . . ) If it was a challenge we could un-
equivocally define its content which would lead to the method of
implementation by necessity. But we cannot do it. (. . . ) That’s
why it remains a problem.” [10, p. 342]
As we could have already seen, the identity of architecture -
reflecting in different forms to the state of periods and societies
– has its roots in the ground of the (artistic) concreteness of the
(architectural) form that is able to evoke the most general things
in a way irreplaceable by any other concepts. But it seems that
this architectural identity, rooting in the ground of concreteness
and being realized in existence, fell prey to the approach of mod-
ern times formed by the mesmerization of utopias and focusing
on the technical progress and the concept of innovation. This is
clear when in technology, the “empty-formal possibility of can-
be-this-way, can-be-that-way” is manifested, and again because
in this period, the idea and fact of freedom bear a negative con-
notation – “it contains the liberation under something instead
of the freedom of becoming something” [10, p. 354,360].
It is interesting because it is modern! In retrospect – look-
ing back not only to the period of classical modern architecture
which was also examined by Lajos Fülep, it seems that this im-
perative had pervaded the history of architecture of the century
and its forming practice even as postmodernism has opposed
the reductionalism of the modernist expedience “besieging the
peeks of time” (less is more) with the eclecticism simulating the
significance of “everything can be quoted” (less is bore).
It seems, one of the reasons for the above is that in both
cases, and nearly in all cases of modern cultural and architec-
tural paradigms, the concept of innovation became the one and
7 [10] ; According to some opinions the „fragments of the 2nd part” may be
considered as the sketches for the whole text.
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only legitimate basis of value, forcing the production of nov-
elties and distinctions, namely differences in form and content.
All then result from both the cultural overproduction speeded
up by technology and from the influence of the innovative logic
of technology on the spirit of the age. In this period, the no-
tion of novelty plays the role of the “cultural-ecological censor-
ship” which was played by the concept of quality in pre-modern
times [14]. As a consequence, the converse relation of qual-
ity and modernity – i.e. it is interesting because it is modern
– has become dependent upon novelty once and for all (and to
the extremes); finds its identity in the concept of “differing” and
“something else”, which are neutral notions from the point of
view of quality.
Although, art can be only modern – stated Lajos Fülep at that
time, analyzing the status of architecture forced momentarily
into expedience, and said: “It is not valuable for being modern
but it is modern for being valuable. Art is concrete.(. . . ) So the
standard of modernity is not the standard of fashion or to "go
with the flow of time", but it is an irreplaceable and indispens-
able chance.” As in Hegel’s opinion on philosophy, Fülep finds
that art – or the "modernity" of art – is actually the realization
of the era. For realizing the period a spiritual-intellectual con-
tent is needed, which stands for itself and which is not only a
moment of technology and expedience but also belongs to the
intellect; “when the place of the intellect is not determined by
technology, but vice versa the place of technology is determined
by the intellect.” [14]
Fülep draws the last conclusion of his train of thoughts as
follows: in this situation, which owes its essence to historical
reasons, not all of the things, which could have become art be-
fore, can become art. In case architecture cannot be “royal art”
in the way it was in historical times, therefore it may be simply
practical too since expedience is not against art. “Everything,
rather than doing bad art. And in practicality, at least the place
should be appreciated and made to be a tradition since there is
nothing else. And in this way art can rise from expedience too.
At the very first time, and from that time on, architecture was
born not when art became practical but on the contrary, when
the practical became art. But it could and can never originate
from the tyranny of expedience. (. . . ) However, in a wider sense
of practicality it is not only material but also intellectual expedi-
ence. Where not only the physical body feels at home and moves
about freely but also the intellect and spirit. (. . . ) This law can
predominate even now if we don’t force, don’t twist and don’t
cripple it. The natural law works “on its own”, i.e. without us –
the spiritual law works through us.” 8
The words written in the first part of the 20th century are still
topical today, and the content coheres with the writings previ-
ously mentioned which worked up or only mentioned architec-
ture and were written before (and partly after) Fülep’s. Here
8[10]: fragments of the 2nd part.
the theoretical centre is not the art-historical interpretation of
the role of creative memory in the determination of form, nor
the matter of sensual-concreteness of form. It is much more,
in harmony with the former ones, the right relation between the
concept of modernity and (artistic) value and the emerging prob-
lems concerning the relation of practicality and art, especially
the conceptual problem concerning technical and intellectual ex-
pedience.
Beside his art-theoretical and architecture-theoretical ap-
proach, Fülep has achieved significant results in the art histori-
cal interpretation of architecture. In his study, Magyar építészet
[Hungarian Architecture], a chapter in his work on Hungarian
Art is perhaps the best well known. This discusses the Hungar-
ian architecture as part of Hungarian art with a historical aspect
and contains theoretical arguments as well. It could be known
for its thorough and even today valid interpretation of Ödön
Lechner’s architecture – though architects are seldom familiar
with it, despite it being the first in the plastic explanation of the
autochthon qualities of the whole of Hungarian art [9].
In the framework of the present essay, it is worthwhile to em-
phasize some sentences from the study’s critique of Lechner,
where the relation between universal and national art, and ac-
cordingly some references to the interpretation of style, become
distinct. Namely, the antagonism of Lechner’s architectural atti-
tude, which, however, led to a uniquely successful solution; and
this way it confirmed that there is not a "royal way” in art which
could be theoretically defined beforehand since – among other
reasons – “art is concrete”.
“Finally Lechner, who was extremely familiar with all kinds
of styles, ended up in rejecting all styles – writes Fülep – and
all relations to style; he disapproved of the regular return to
primitive styles in order to reach the plane – the mere wall.
And when he found it and rejected everything in order to cre-
ate space, a pure space, then the chance for a new architecture
appeared. (. . . ) The same happened in the West, but for differ-
ent reasons and aims. In western countries, architects returned
to flat walls, as they were free from all embarrassing fripperies
and because new building materials forced them to do so. Lech-
ner’s reason was to bring out the vernacular forming-language
in the flat element of the wall. Searching for the national, he
found international, looking for Asian he found European, for
special, the universal and for ancient the modern and current
style. The westerner’s understanding of the problems in con-
structing buildings has always been an obvious demand on him:
he did not need to find the European problem of modern building
but the way leading to it and the possibility of such a solution
in which the universal can be realized through national and na-
tional through universal. This was his specific challenge. . . ”
[12, pp 52-53]. And so on. Although some have the opinion that
the matter of the relationship between national and universal is
not a problem anymore in architecture and art; although this is a
doubtful approach, the clarification of this historically conflict-
ing relationship would be interesting in retrospect. This could
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be cleared up perhaps with the help of Lajos Fülep’s thoughts,
which are just as valid today, at least for the sake of the “intel-
lectual expedience” of contemporary Hungarian architecture.
The concepts appearing in these studies are built upon one an-
other, and sometimes their relationship requires interpretation.
This suggests that the categories playing the main role in the
different essays could be organized into a coherent theory or a
theoretical construction. Furthermore, the elements of this intel-
lectual construction could create a curve from art philosophical
erudition to art historical intuition. Or they could make it if pos-
terity found the knowledge worth studying and thus learned that
which is accumulated in the “a bit forgotten “ art-theoretical, ar-
chitectural theoretical and historical works of Fülep. This work
could bear not only a scientific-historical significance but also
the cognition of Fülep’s intellectual horizon could be very in-
spiring in architecture and in thinking about architecture.
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